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The organisational, institutional and political development of the European Union (EU) 
has implied a major change in domestic politics. While the Union objectives were just the long-
term development of a common market but with just few policy competences, the EU arena was 
not so relevant for domestic policies and parties. But since the 1980s with the Single European 
Act and especially the Maastricht treaty and the development of the political Union, the growing 
relevance of the EU, conceptualised as a new polity, has an important effect on national political 
systems. This change is fairly shown by the new specific subfield on the research agenda 
regarding EU studies, that is, the analysis of the effects of European integration on member 
states’ actors and institutions. That is what it has been labelled as Europeanisation, the reaction 
and adaptation of Member states to the process of European integration.  Nowadays the EU 
has many policy competences in very different domains. Therefore, it is interesting to analyse 
how political parties react to these European policies. Because the EU is a general project of 
economic and political integration, but is also a new polity with certain outputs and policy 
outcomes.  
The aim of this paper is to analyse the saliency of Europe in electoral and parliamentary 
competition in 11 parties/coalitions in Italy and Spain in three broad policy domains, Foreign, 
Economic and Social policies. Thus, what is the importance parties give to Europe? Does it vary 
from electoral to parliamentary competition? Why do parties enact or downplay the European 
issue in political competition? For answering these questions, this paper is structured as follows. 
In the first part, a necessarily brief a review of the current debate on Europeanisation and 
political parties will be done. Then the main theories, hypotheses and research design will be 
explained. The second part is the empirical analysis of Europeanisation and political conflict 
focusing on the evolution in time, the different policies analysed and on individual parties. 
Finally, different conclusions of the empirical analysis will be assessed. 
 
Europeanisation: A contested concept 
The growing competences of the European Union not just in the economic domain but 
also, especially after the Maastricht Treaty, on political issues, has changed scholars’ attention 
from the creation of the EU, that is, why Member States lose competences to the EU and how 
European integration is created; to the effects of the EU in the Member States. The growing 
literature on Europeanisation shows this change in the research agenda. Now, the focus is not 
just in explaining why the EU as a polity has more competences, which is still the most studied 
aspect in EU studies; but the effects, impact and uses of the EU at the domestic level. In this 
last case, the research questions have changed, focusing mainly at the domestic level and 
trying to track down the possible consequences of the process of European integration. Does 
Europe matter? What are its effects? Does it produce convergence and harmonisation? What 
domains are Europeanised and to what extend? One special characteristic of the EU is the 
widespread policy competences and the advanced political aspects of this process of regional 
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integration (Hix 2005: 21-22). The presence of the European Commission and of the EP, the 
creation of the European Court of Justice or the European Central Bank, which imply an 
important loss in policy instruments by Member States are a clear example of the qualitative 
step forward undertaken by the EU. Therefore, the concept of Europeanisation is very 
interesting to analyse what are the influences of the EU on its Members. 
Although the concept and meanings of Europeanisation are still the object of a lively 
debate (Cowles et al 2001; Hix and Goetz 2001; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Vink and 
Graziano 2006), one can submit that Member States adapt their political structures in response 
to the set of constraints and opportunities posed by European integration. The definition of what 
Europeanisation is; how does it works; or its effects and consequences, vary according to 
different frameworks and research designs. The study of Europeanisation has been 
characterised by a primacy on the analysis of public policy (see Featherstone 2003) that has 
influenced the research designs and the subjects covered by the different researches. However, 
with the growing ‘political’ competences of the EU, the scope of the analysis has shifted (see 
Goetz 2002, Radaelli 2004), with studies that cover other aspects, such as governments, 
parliaments, political parties and other political actors and institutions. 
 The lack of a common understanding of what Europeanisation is can be fairly showed in 
the different definitions proposed by scholars (Andersen and Eliassen 1993, Börzel 2001; 
Kohler-Koch 1999; Risse, Cowles and Caporaso 2001; Ladrech 1994, 2002; Radaelli 2000; 
Bache and Marshall 2004; Dyson and Goetz 2003; Graziano and Vink 2006). These definitions 
show how the concept is used in different terms and with reference to different processes.  
 Thus, there is not a clear definition of what Europeanisation means, to whom it applies 
and there is not a common understanding of its mechanisms. However, there is an agreement 
on what Europeanisation is not, which is a first step. Europeanisation is not a theory but a 
process because Europeanisation is an explanandum rather than an explanans (Gualini 2003) 
or in Radaelli’s (2004: 2) words, Europeanisation is a problem, something to be explained, 
rather than a solution, something that explains. Second, Europeanisation is normally seen as 
the impact of the EU on Member States (EU-isation), but, with the growing competences of the 
EU, its exact role (as source or facilitator of change) is being questioned (Bulmer and Lequesne 
2005). This is also a matter of dissent. According to certain scholars, the EU is not necessary 
for Europeanisation and therefore is not equivalent to EU-isation (Irondelle 2003; Graziano and 
Vink 2006). Consequently, non-EU members can be affected by this process. Even though, I 
understand that Europeanisation is strictly related to the European Union. Being an EU member 
(or a prospective one) implies that European laws and regulations are legally binding and policy 
options much more reduced than in countries where there is a ‘voluntary’ adaptation, for 
whatever reason, to the EU. Third, Europeanisation is not European Integration. Indeed, the 
former implies the latter. Finally, unless actors are entirely passive in their response to 
Europeanisation, they are likely to respond through inputs into integration and policy process. 
The relation between the EU and domestic political dimension is sometimes difficult to 
assess even if scholars have highlighted the increasing effects and constraints posed by the 
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increasing EU’s competences and the problem that domestic parties and leadership face (Hix 
and Goetz 2001; Cotta 2005; Ladrech 2005). Different lines of research have been pursued 
stressing the EU’s direct impacts on domestic political competition (Mair 2001). One of the main 
lines deals with parties’ position towards European integration and the growing feeling of 
Euroscepticism (Taggart 1998; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2003; Sitter 2002). Another direct 
impact can be the level of contestation of European matters in national elections and how policy 
entrepreneurs can seize the opportunity to differentiate themselves in EU terms (van der Eijk 
and Franklin 2004:47). In this sense, the literature on salience of Europe seems rather 
interesting (see the special issue of Electoral Studies 2007 for some analysis and 
methodological pitfalls). For the analysis of saliency, different approaches have been used like 
expert surveys’ data (Ray 1999; Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 20021), newspaper coverage 
(Hobolt 2004; Kriesi 2007) or electoral manifestos (Pennings 2006). However, further analysis 
should be carried out on other types of documents (like parliamentary speeches or party 
congress interventions) and more explicative rather than descriptive accounts could be done. 
Finally, scholars also recognise indirect effects such as the growing constraints on policy 
manoeuvrability, the disempowerment of elections and voters and the existence of a 
mainstream consensus that reduces the level of choice for the electorate. Both characteristics 
can reinforce the aspect of the irrelevance of conventional politics (Mair 2001, Bartolini 2005). 
Bartolini distinguishes four main models for analysing national parties’ attitudes towards the EU: 
a) The Geopolitical Model2.; b) The Institutional Model3; c) The Partisan Model4; and d) The 
Genetic Model5. As he argues, all these models have some truth even if the partisan and 
genetic approaches are the ones more used to explain the difficult relation between national 
parties and European integration. 
Salience Theory, Domestic Political Competition and European Integration 
Salience theory is probably the most suitable theory to study and analyse the 
importance parties give to European integration on domestic political competition.  Salience 
theory differs from the more classical idea of ‘great debate’, or confrontational theory, where 
parties and leaders oppose and debate on a whole range of issues (Budge and Farlie 1987, 
Budge 1994, Budge et al 2001; Klingemann et al 2006).  However, this intuitive confrontational 
theory does not reflect the actual manner in which parties position themselves.  As Budge 
                                                 
1
 They use the Chapel Hill Data Set on Parties and Europe,  that contains experts’ evaluations on party 
positions on European integration from 1994 to 2002 for 23 European countries (in 2002). 
2
  Where difference into support/opposition among national parties should be less significant 
than the differences across nations. 
3 Suggests that parties in government are generally more supportive to European integration 
than those in opposition, and that those parties- whether in government or opposition, that 
belong to the EU-level coalition tend to be more supportive. 
4 Where variation within European party family should be reduced, while variation among 
national partied should be much higher 
5 Starts from an objective definition of the main EU features (Centralisation, bureaucratisation, 
economicism/national-regional independence, resistance to market economy and globalisation) 
and then relates it with domestic cleavages 
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(1987) correctly argues in his preliminary analysis of party manifestos, other parties or other 
policies in each party platform are not directly mentioned (or they are marginal).  Equally, 
parties differ sharply in their emphasis according to the policy issue, where he identifies some 
‘proprietal topics’ for parties.  Therefore, following Salience theory, parties and leaders normally 
do not oppose a certain issue, rather they emphasise some issues while neglecting others.  As 
Budge argues “the taking up of positions is done through emphasizing the importance of certain 
policy areas compared to others.  Policy change consists in de-emphasizing previous priorities 
and taking up new ones” (Budge 1994: 45).  Therefore, we can argue that issue salience is 
strictly related to importance; the more an issue is salient the more it is important for both 
parties and the electorate. 
We can define salience “as the extent to which the party leadership considers an issue 
as vital for its electoral appeal” (Netjes and Binnema 2007: 40).  The concept is important 
because it can be used to explain how parties compete with each other and for understanding 
the relationship between party position and voter preferences.  The above definition may have a 
top-down bias, because the relationship between party-voters preferences is difficult to assess.  
Indeed, voters could have a strong position on certain issues and political parties may be forced 
to adopt a clearer opinion on that specific issue. Furthermore, the definition is just centred on 
electoral competition even though it can be equally applied to parliamentary competition. 
Hence, for our main interests, the definition is suitable, especially if we are dealing with 
European integration.  This specific aspect of the relationship of party salience in an issue and 
the relationship with voters, the median voter and other parties, brings up the concept of 
systemic salience.  As parties compete with other parties in a political system, and aim to 
elaborate policies that their possible voters may support, their salience in a precise issue is 
correlated in many cases with public opinion and other parties’ position on that issue.   
We can distinguish between two analytically different, although interrelated, aspects of 
salience: systemic salience and individual party salience.  We can define systemic salience as 
the overall salience of a single issue in a specific political system.  According to this, and 
following Steenbergen and Scott (2004), the saliency of European integration in a party is 
higher when it is higher in the other parties within the system.  Systemic salience can be 
measured by using some kind of public opinion data to infer the importance voters give to a 
certain issue, in our case, European integration, or by measuring the salience score in that 
specific issue of all the parties in the political system (Steenbergen and Scott 2004: 173, using 
expert data surveys), or by analysing newspapers coverage (Hobolt 2004; Kriesi 2007).  
Salience is an important concept and is central to our analysis, because lack of saliency implies 
that parties do not compete or do not position themselves in that specific issue.  For competing 
in a given issue, parties need to have some incentives, whether they consider that issue as a 
winning issue or not, if other competing parties have a different position on it, and if the 
electorate and the media consider it an important and decisive issue for voting.   
Salience is related with the specific political context, but is also dependent on the 
different strategies parties may adopt.  Issues that are considered irrelevant are not salient in 
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political (electoral or parliamentary) competition; however, a lack of salience does not directly 
imply that the issue is not at all important to parties or to the electorate.  Indeed, according to 
salience theory, parties will emphasise those issues where they consider have an added value 
and will de-emphasise those that do not, or have roughly the same position as their rival 
parties6.  Therefore, lack of saliency can imply a collusion of opposing parties on that specific 
issue.  As there is not a distinct position, parties will try to de-emphasise that issue.  This can be 
particularly relevant in the case of European integration such that, as in many European 
countries, the general process of European integration is widely accepted by voters and 
mainstream political parties tend to support it, more or less enthusiastically.  Therefore, parties 
do not have the incentive to stress an issue when they have the same position as their rival 
parties, especially during election periods.  Then, even if the issue can be of great importance, 
parties will downplay that issue.  Another possible explanation of lack of salience can be 
attributed to intra-party disagreement (Steenbergen and Scott 2004).  This aspect is especially 
relevant, again in election time, because parties prefer to display an image of unity rather than 
an image of division.  Consequently, polemic and not consensual issues within the party are 
normally de-emphasised independently of their importance.  Finally, salience is dependent on 
the specific and short-term context.  Some issues, both in the electoral and parliamentary 
arena, can be pre-eminent and predominant while others may be downplayed.  In this sense, 
political stability is an important factor.  If some issues, such as the legitimation of the incumbent 
government or the functioning of the entire political system, are at stake, those special issues 
will be the most salient and will overshadow other important themes and policies. 
Therefore, salience is very important for the analysis of certain direct impacts of 
European integration on domestic party systems and political competition as well as the 
creation of a new cleavage or dimension of competition (Tsebelis and Garret 2000; Hooghe and 
Marks 2001; Hix and Lord 1997; Steenbergen and Marks 2004 for discussion).  If European 
integration is not salient, it is difficult to assume the creation of a European dimension or 
cleavage (Ray 2006, Conti 2007).  However, it is not clear or assumed that European 
integration implies a new cleavage for domestic politics.  Rather, integration can imply new 
opportunities and constraints that parties may adapt to their pre-existing ideologies or strategies 
in a given period.  Indeed, the recent interest in this direct impact is due to the growing EU 
competences and the development of a supranational polity with many important policy 
competences that force parties to take clearer positions.  However, even if this claim is stated 
by many scholars, there is little empirical research to support it (Hobolt 2004; Netjes and 
Binnema 2006).  Salience has been studied using mostly electoral programmes, expert surveys, 
opinion polls (such as the European Electoral Survey or Eurobarometers), media coverage 
(mainly newspapers), and focusing on election periods (especially, for obvious reasons, those 
using electoral programmes).   
                                                 
6
 As Bartolini (2002) argues, policy decidability, that is, the presentation of a different political 
programme, clearly distinguished by the electorate is crucial for political competition. 
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Scholarly attention on salience and European integration has been growing but some 
issues have not been addressed.  First of all, the saliency of European integration has been 
analysed, with few exceptions (Pennings 2006), referring to the whole process of European 
integration.  That is, the attention has been exclusively centred on how important the issue was 
perceived by parties, party leaders or voters.  Indeed, one of the hypotheses is that European 
integration as such, should be more salient because it is objectively more important, especially 
after the Maastricht treaty.  Even though it is a very interesting and crucial aspect, we should 
take into account that, as the European policy competences grow and the subsequent saliency 
of European integration is predicted to increase, that salience should vary according to the 
policy issue.  Hence, we could expect increasing European salience in some specific policy 
domains (such as the economic one), due to the increasing and sometimes predominant 
European competences.  A second aspect is related to electoral competition.  Scholars have 
pointed out the importance of issue saliency to understand the relation between parties and 
voters and the strategic uses that parties and leaders have of specific issues to pursue their 
strategic goals.  However, parties do not just compete in the electoral arena but in the 
parliamentary arena as well.  The analysis of parliamentary debates can be very fruitful, 
because it can complement some of the weaker points that the electoral manifesto analyses 
produce.  As Marks et al. (2007) argued electoral programmes have some weaknesses such as 
declared salience, timing and dissent.  Declared salience implies that electoral programmes 
“are strategic documents designed to put a party in a positive light during electoral campaigns” 
(Marks et al.  2007: 27) and therefore just positive issues (and not negatives ones) will be 
addressed.  Equally, electoral timing can be a problem, taking into account that elections are 
scheduled in different periods across countries and may pose a problem on time-sensitive issue 
such as European integration.  Finally, programmes do not provide for intra-party dissent 
because they are consensually adopted by the party.  Then, as Ladrech claims, manifesto and 
programme development are almost useless as “realistic indicators of actual future government 
action (particularly where EU competences are involved)” (Ladrech 2007: 226).  Without being 
so negative regarding party platforms, it is true that they may not reflect the real party action in a 
variety of issues, that time may be a problem and that the consensual nature of electoral 
programmes may not reflect internal dissent.  In this sense, parliamentary interventions seem to 
be the most appropriate way to try to solve these problems.  Debates in the Parliament imply 
that parties and leaders have to take part and specify their position on a specific issue, defend 
their action or proposals in a clear way and, as they are held regularly, the time allowed for 
debate needs to be corrected.  These are the main reasons why this paper aims to analyse 
salience in parliamentary interventions as well.    
From the overall discussion we can derive some hypotheses related with the saliency of 
Europe in the domestic party and party system: 
 
H1 General Hypothesis.  The saliency of Europe increases with time.  The more Europe has 
political and policy competences, the more it is salient in the domestic political debate.  
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As I previously stated, scholars argue that the saliency of Europe should increase once 
Europe has more importance and policy competences and, consequently, Europe has more 
direct consequences in the domestic political system.   However, different facts can influence 
this general statement.  Therefore:  
 
H1.2 The saliency of Europe is related with the party’s position on European integration. 
Saliency in parties with a unitary and positive attitude towards integration will be higher than 
parties that are internally divided or against integration. 
 
H1.3 Differential Impact.  According to the degree of communitarisation of the European policy, 
Europe will be more or less salient.  As it was stated, Europe plays a differential policy role and, 
therefore, the salience of the European issue should vary according to the policy domain.  In 
this paper three broad policy areas will be studied: foreign, economic and social policy.   
 
H1.4 The saliency of Europe is different according to the arena of competition.  Salience in 
electoral programmes is more incremental while salience in parliamentary interventions is more 
discontinuous.   
To test these hypotheses, I will use a historical-comparative research design (Gerring 
2007). This specific type of research design allows both spatial and temporal and cross-case 
and within-case analysis. While the main units of analysis are fairly clear, that is, political 
parties, the temporal boundaries are assumed, deriving from the ‘critical juncture’ that the 
Maastricht treaty represented, both in terms of increasing EU competences and the creation of 
the Political Union, to the Constitutional treaty, another relevant moment, even if failed, on the 
process of European integration. This method also allows for diachronic analysis, the variation 
of a single party over time; and synchronic analysis, within case variation at a single point in 
time (Gerring 2007: 27). These two aspects are fundamental if we conceptualise 
Europeanisation as a process. Thus, we can compare the relevance and saliency of Europe in 
different parties in the same period and, equally, to observe that saliency of Europe for each 
party during time. 
An Index for Measuring Salience in Electoral and Parliamentary Competition 
 In this paper, a specific indicator to analyse saliency will be used by applying an easy 
procedure present in the content analysis software, Hamlet II.  This software allows counting 
word co-occurrences within the text, permitting the elaboration of a specific indicator for saliency 
(Brier and Hopp 2006).  The first step to analyse the documents using Hamlet II, is the creation 
of a meaningful and coherent dictionary.  This is the most important part for the analysis of 
documents using a dictionary-based software, because not only the dictionary is the central 
component for the analysis, but it is the only moment (albeit crucial) where the researcher can 
influence the results.  Hence, a meaningful, comprehensive and operative dictionary has to be 
created. For the analysis of salience, a specific dictionary has been created that takes into 
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account all of the possible EU-related words that can appear in the text, a single category has 
been created for this purpose.  Utilizing this dictionary, the analysis gives us three types of data: 
the total number of EU-related words in the text, the percentage of EU-related words compared 
with the overall number of words in the text and the number of context-units (sentences) with 
EU-related words over the total number of context units.  This last data is the most relevant for 
our purposes and the Salience indicator that will be use throughout the entire project is quite 
simple: 
S= ECU / TCU x 100 
 
Where S is Salience, ECU is the number of context-units with at least one EU-related word, 
TCU is the total number of context units present in the text.  Hence, the indicator goes from zero 
(no EU-related word in the whole text) to one-hundred (all sentences in the text have at least 
one EU-related word).  This indicator allows for a fast analysis of the documents and permits 
applying it to different documents, such as parliamentary interventions, which consents the 
comparison between different documents in different arenas of competition.   
On the Cases and Document Selection 
In this paper two countries, Italy and Spain, and eleven parties have been selected.  
This selection is made for a variety of reasons.  In first place, Italy and Spain joined the EU in 
different periods; Italy was a founding member while Spain entered in the third enlargement, 
and some scholars agree that the longer a country is a EU member, the more ‘europeanised’ it 
should be (Pennings 2006).  Secondly, their party systems are different, with diverse 
institutional settings, party system dynamics, effective number of parties or the degree of 
polarisation (Bruneau et al. 2001).  Equally interesting, both countries experienced a 
reconstruction of the party system. Spain reconstructed and consolidated its party system after 
almost 40 years of authoritarian rule, while Italy suffered a major party system change in the 
beginning of the 1990s.  In both cases, the European Union was already a developed political 
entity, and could have played a role in the redefinition of policy priorities of the new parties.  
Thirdly, Spain and Italy are the two biggest Southern European countries, with similar European 
interests, where Europe has been traditionally conceptualised as an opportunity for 
modernisation to overcome internal traditional constraints but the picture may be changing in 
the last years with the growing effects of European policies. Therefore, change in the 
conceptualisation of the EU seems to be taking place.  Finally, specifically regarding economic 
performance, both countries are opposite one another.  Even though Italy and Spain faced 
serious constraints and pressures to adapt their economy to fulfil the Maastricht criteria, Spain 
did it successfully, and benefited for a long time of the new opportunities offered by the Single 
Market, while Italy seems to be struggling with its adaptation, as statistics in economic growth 
and public debt control demonstrate.  This differential success in adaptation to European 
policies is also interesting for analysing the salience and usage of Europe in national political 
parties and competition. 
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Within the Spanish and Italian cases, different parties have been selected.  In the 
Spanish case, both majoritarian and governmental parties, the Popular Party (PP) and the 
Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) have been chosen.  They represent two different 
ideologies (conservatism and social democracy) and two different organisational paths. Two 
other minor parties have been select: United Left (IU) and the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV).  
These parties represent two different ideologies.  IU is a federation of different parties lead by 
the Communist party, while the PNV is an ethnoregionalist party with strong regional support.  
IU has evolved in its position towards European integration to a more critical stance, due to the 
market-oriented and lack of social policy of the current process of integration.  Meanwhile, the 
PNV was one of the most Euroenthusiastic parties, and was considered as a way to ‘overcome’, 
in a certain way, the Spanish central state. In the case of parliamentary debates, the Catalans 
of Convergència I Uniò (CIU) will be also analysed, as they played a crucial role as external 
supporters of both socialist and conservative governments during the mid 1990’s. 
In the Italian case, the two most important and most voted parties have been selected, 
the Democrats of the Left (DS) and Forza Italia (FI).  They also represent socialdemocracy and 
conservatism respectively, ascribing to the European Socialist and European Popular Party 
families, even though they come from different paths than the Spanish equivalent parties.  
Furthermore, taking into account the specificities of the Italian party system, four other parties 
have been selected.  First, two parties have been chosen that reflect, as in the Spanish case, 
two different ideologies: communism (Rifondazione Comunista, RC) and ethnoregionalism 
(Lega Nord, LN).  Finally, we have to consider that, due to the change in electoral law, Italy is 
starting to develop bipolar competition, with the Olive Tree Coalition (Ulivo, then Unione with 
RC) formed by DS, Margherita, UDEUR, PDCI, the Greens, and other minor parties and the 
Freedom House (CDL) a coalition with FI, AN, UDC and LN. 
 Regarding the time period under analysis, in this paper I consider the Maastricht Treaty 
as a critical juncture. Hence, the time span covers the period prior to the negotiation and 
implementation of this Treaty and goes until the failed European Constitution.   
 Finally, two types of documents have been selected, Electoral Programmes and 
Parliamentary Interventions in Investiture and Budget Debates. On the one hand, electoral 
programmes represent a set of key central statements of party positions’ (Budge, Robertson, 
Hearl 1987:18), usually ratified in party conventions, representative for the whole party and 
allow for diachronic analysis of changing policy positions (see also Appendix II ‘Manifesto 
Coding Instructions in Klingemann et al 2006).  In our case, these electoral programmes permit 
us to analyse how parties use Europe in the policy statements during general elections.  They 
allow both synchronic and diachronic analysis in the electoral arena. The analysis of salience in 
electoral programmes will be done in two steps.  First, the analysis of salience in the overall 
electoral programme will be done. Then the same electoral programme will be divided into three 
main issue areas: economic, foreign and social policy.  In some cases, the distinction of each 
issue is quite simple, especially regarding foreign policy.  It is more difficult in economic policy, 
where strictly economic aspects have been included, but not issues referring to industrial and 
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energy policies.  Equally, social policy is addressed differently by each party, and issues 
regarding employment, immigration, welfare, health, family policies and housing policies have 
been included.  This dictionary (in both Spanish and Italian) allows for the comparison of 
salience in the electoral programmes. 
 While the analysis of Electoral Manifestos deals with policy positions that parties 
advocate in the electoral arena, parliamentary speeches refer to another face of the party, the 
party in public office.  Two different parliamentary debates will be analysed.  On the one hand, 
mainly general domestic political debates, such as government investiture debates. In these 
debates, the Prime Minister/President of the Government explains the general policy program 
that his government will apply. On the other hand, a more specific debate, such as Budget 
debates. This debate and the Budget Law (Presupuestos Generales del Estado in Spain and 
Legge Finanziaria in Italy) sanctions probably the most important law approved by the 
government each year. In every case, just plenary sessions debates will be analysed.  This is 
done for a variety of reasons: a) the more general and less technical nature of these debates, b) 
the higher profile of the speakers (normally party leaders), c) following the concept of 
Europeanisation, the importance that Europe and its policies have in the domestic political 
debate at large, rather than in the more specific European-issues context and d) the higher 
relevance of these debates in public opinion.   
SWITCHING ON, OFF, OR STAND BY: EVIDENCES FROM ITALY AND SPAIN 
The importance parties give to Europe in the electoral and parliamentary arena is 
crucial for understanding if parties consider Europe as an important issue for their electoral 
appeal or in parliamentary competition.  If Europe is not salient at all, and parties consistently 
neglect the issue, the politicization of Europe and the possible creation of a new dimension of 
contestation will be very low.  Therefore, the analysis of salience is a fundamental first step for 
analysing how parties interiorise Europe and the possible consequences of the new European 
polity in national party systems. In this section, I will compare saliency of Europe in Spanish and 
Italian parties in both electoral and parliamentary competition. Following the hypotheses 
mentioned above, the analysis will be centred in different aspects such as time, policies, and 
parties in the two distinct political arenas. 
 
Saliency in Time and Policies 
The first and more general hypothesis, claimed by different scholars and logically 
intuitive but not always empirically proved relates the increasing European competences during 
all treaty negotiations with a higher domestic importance of Europe. Consequently, as it was 
stated in Hypothesis 1, the saliency of Europe in political competition should increase with time. 
The following tables provide us with the mean the saliency of Europe for all Italian and Spanish 
political parties in the overall electoral programmes, foreign, economic and social policy 
proposals within the manifesto, and investiture and budget debates by year of election or 
debate in Italy and Spain.  This mean score could be considered as the systemic saliency of 
Europe in each party system, as it is formed by the salience score of each party under analysis.  
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According to our main hypothesis, salience should increase in electoral programmes and 
parliamentary debates due to the growing European competences, as parties react to the new 
European polity.  Different aspects should be highlighted. 
 
[Table 1 to 4 around here] 
 
 Firstly, as a general trend, Europe seems to gain importance with time.  If we compare 
the salience in the first and last years of the parties’ documents analysed, we can observe that 
salience is always higher in the 2000s than at the end of the 1980s (see Tables 1 and 2 for 
electoral programmes in Italy and Spain and Tables 3 and 4 for parliamentary debates).  
However, the data are also very clear: Europe was more salient in the mid 1990s, and 
especially in 1996.  Regarding the overall electoral programme, which includes all the policy 
domains, the higher mean salience was in 1996 for both Italy and Spain7.  This is also true as 
regards budget policy debates, where the mid 1990s where those with a higher systemic 
salience (15, 29 in 1996 for Italy and 9, 50 and 10, 60 for the 1996-1997 debates in Spain).  In 
the case of the Investiture Debates, this trend is also confirmed in Italy, where the first Prodi 
investiture in 1996 was among the most salient in Italy with a mean salience of 7, 67,  just below 
the 1998 D’Alema’s investiture (7, 71).  In the Spanish case, however, it is the 1989 debate the 
most salient (16, 00) which can be understandable as they were the first years of Spanish 
European membership while 1996 sanctioned the first government alternation since 1982.  
Secondly, in the case of the specific policy proposals within the electoral programmes, we can 
find two interesting features that match with our second hypothesis regarding salience: the 
differential salience according to the policy issue and their different pattern during time.  
 The mean saliency of Europe clearly shows that it is in foreign policy proposals where 
the saliency of Europe is the highest ranging from the lowest 25, 50 and the highest 52, 25 in 
Italy (for the 1983 and 1996 elections respectively) and 32, 25 and 42, 25 for Spain (in the 1993 
and 2004 elections).  In both countries we can observe that Europe has been increasingly 
gaining importance during the years, confirming that Europe is a key component of each 
country’s foreign policy and that, following the growing European importance, salience raises.  
In second place, as expected, salience is higher in economic proposals than in social ones.  
Differently from foreign policy proposals, salience in the economic part of the electoral 
programmes is very dependent on the crucial moment of the Economic and Monetary Union’s 
implementation.  The mid 1990s was the period where those countries aspiring to join the Euro 
reformed their economies to fulfil the economic criteria established in Maastricht.  Hence, 
Europe gained salience in economic proposals (and in budget parliamentary interventions) due 
to the clear objectives imposed by the EMU, the fixed term to fulfil them, by 1999, and the clear 
purpose and goals of that reforms, to join the Euro.  Thus, while European salience in foreign 
policy seems to follow an increasing trend matching the growing European competences, as 
                                                 
7
 Except in Spain for the overall electoral programme’s mean in 1989 was 12, 00 compared with the 11, 
25 of the 1996 ones.   
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stated by our general hypothesis, in the case of economic policy its salience is much more 
dependent on relevant moments of integration, such as the EMU.  Therefore, 1996 electoral 
programmes and the 1996-1998 budget debates are those with a higher European salience.  
Finally, Social policy proposals are those with a lower European salience.  As it was argued, 
Europe lacks of a clear and comprehensive set of social policies, as many of the EU detractors 
claim.  Hence, following salience theory, European importance should be the lowest, as it is the 
case.  Furthermore, the saliency in social issues is stable through the years, even if with a small 
increase in European salience with time.  In a policy domain where Europe has no clear policy 
competences, political parties do not stress the European issue, while in policies where the EU 
has real competences, it plays a more important role. 
 
A Tale of Two Countries and Two Arenas 
Another two relevant aspects have to be considered when analysing European salience 
at the country level: the comparison between Spanish and Italian salience, and, the saliency of 
Europe in electoral and parliamentary arenas. Regarding the first aspect, some scholars, 
notably Pennings (2006) suggested that those countries with a longer membership should have 
a higher European salience than new members because they have had more time to adapt to 
the new polity, they were part of the negotiations since the beginning of the European process 
and consequently they should be more Europeanised. In Table 5, we can observe the mean 
salience in Spain and Italy in each arena of competition. 
 
[Table 5 around here] 
 As the data indicate, the mean the saliency of Europe varies according to the specific 
arena and the type of document or intervention.  On the overall electoral programmes, salience 
is higher in Spain than in Italy (9, 46 and 8, 42 respectively). However, in specific policy 
domains within the electoral programme the picture somehow changes. In economic proposals 
in general election programmes salience is also higher in Spain but in foreign policy proposals 
is consistently higher in Italy than in Spain, while in social policy the mean is almost the same 
for both countries.  If we compare the salience of each policy domain with the general mean of 
the overall electoral programme, we can observe that Foreign policy is by far, well above the 
mean salience, showing the high importance of Europe in this specific policy. In the economic 
field, Spanish parties mean salience is just above the mean salience of the overall electoral 
programme while in Italy is just below. Finally, social policy mean is much lower than in the rest 
of the manifesto.  
In parliamentary competition, we can observe two interesting aspects: in Investiture 
debates, Europe is much more salient in Spain than in Italy, almost doubling it and, opposite, 
salience is higher in budget debates in the Italian case than in the Spanish one. Regarding 
Investiture Debates and the differential salience in both countries, we have to take into account 
some contextual and institutional factors that may explain such variation. In institutional terms, 
we can observe some important differences in the debates’ procedures.  In the Spanish case, 
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there is a monopolisation of those crucial debates by party leaders.  Consequently, in the 
debates in plenary sessions just the leader or speaker of the parliamentary group intervenes, 
with a longer, more comprehensive and structured intervention than in the Italian case.  In Italy, 
there is a much prominent role of the two Chambers of the Parliament, the Camera dei Deputati 
and the Senato, which is coherent with a perfect bicameralism system.  This institutional setting 
can account for longer legislative processes, as every law needs the approval of each chamber 
and there is a more prominent role of the single Member of Parliament than in Spain.  While in 
Spain just the leader of the parliamentary group intervenes, with longer exposition of its political 
project and the reasons for supporting or rejecting the candidate’s investiture; in Italy the debate 
is much more fragmented, a trend followed also in budget parliamentary debates, difficulting a 
clear and comprehensive exposition of the political arguments used by each party.  
Consequently, Spanish interventions are more structured and allow a clearer and more 
comprehensive debate with longer interventions where Europe can play a more prominent role 
than in the Italian case that, due to higher number of interventions, the vote declaration is 
necessarily shorter and more centred in the most prominent political issues than in Spain.  
Whether this institutional setting is common in all parliamentary debates, such as 
budget policy, there is a second important aspect that can account for the much lower European 
salience in Investiture Debates in Italy than in Spain: contextual factors and notably 
governmental stability.  In this case, Spain and Italy represent to extreme cases, where Spain is 
a clear example of stability, even with minoritarian governments, while Italy is a paradigmatic 
case of governmental instability, with 14 governments in the 19 years under analysis (1987-
2006). In those investiture debates that followed general elections in Italy, European salience 
was higher than in those debates held in the middle of the legislature.  This fact can be 
explained by the legitimacy of the incumbent government derived from elections, opposite of the 
one emerged from a political crisis.  In this last case, the saliency of Europe in the Prime 
Minister’s declaration can be higher, as Europe is used to legitimise his incumbency.  On the 
other hand, opposition leaders focus more on the reasons for the political crisis, the coherence 
of the majority supporting the new government, and on legitimacy issues of a government that 
does not derive from general elections.  Therefore, some more prominent issues can downplay 
the importance of Europe.  The XIII Legislature (1996-2001) investiture debates, with four 
governments, offer a clear example of the importance of governmental stability on the saliency 
of Europe.  Those debates where held in the crucial period of the EMU implementation.  While 
in Prodi’s I investiture (the only one held after the elections), but also in D’Alema’s I in 1998, 
their European salience was very high, especially in their Programmatic Declaration, the 
opposition leaders’ saliency of Europe was very low or even nonexistent, due to the higher 
importance of more institutional and systemic issues in those debates, rather than policy-
substantive ones.  These two factors, institutional and contextual, can account for much of the 
difference on the saliency of Europe in investiture debates. 
 A second interesting result is showed by the saliency of Europe in Budget Parliamentary 
Debates that is higher in Italy than in Spain.  In this case, the difference can be explained by the 
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different success in adapting to the Single European Market. Spain successfully reduced 
government debt well below 60%, and controlled the annual government deficit under 3%.  The 
only indicator where Spain did not perform as expected was inflation.  However, the EMU’s 
process was done in a moment of continuous economic growth that started in 1994 and 
continued until 2007 in very positive levels.  In Italy, the situation was the opposite.  The 
Maastricht criteria were somehow achieved, but government debt ranked among the highest in 
Europe and the EMU adaptation was done in a period of low economic growth and even 
recession.  Therefore, once the Euro was adopted and the Single European Market was 
established, the economic situation in both countries was different.  Consequently, Italy suffered 
more by the policy limits of the new Monetary Union, with the European Central Bank focusing 
more on inflation control, which suited Spanish interests, and not in economic growth, as it was 
necessary for Italian economy.  Furthermore, Italian economy, characterised by the high 
number of small and medium enterprises were affected by the new European competition, and 
they did not perform well.  Thus, while in Spain Europe was very salient, as in Italy, during the 
mid 1990s, the importance of the EMU and the European arena declined in parliamentary 
debates after the Euro’s accession.  Meanwhile in Italy, due to the perceived negative 
consequences of the single currency, the issue was more politicised and European salience 
kept its importance, and even rose, in the first years of the XXI century.  Therefore, economic 
performance and successful economic adaptation can account for the differential role of Europe 
in budget parliamentary debates.  A second aspect that I will address below is the position of 
Spanish and Italian political parties towards European integration and the Euro.   
The idea that countries with longer European membership should have a higher 
European salience is not totally supported by our data.  Different factors can account for the 
differential importance of Europe.  Whether the analysis is limited in time, the last 20 years, the 
data show how European importance varies according to the policy issue and the arena of 
competition.  However, Spain shows a higher salience in the overall electoral programme, in the 
crucial economic policy and in investiture debates, while in the Italian case, Europe is more 
important in foreign policy and in budget parliamentary debates.  Some institutional and 
contextual factors play an important role in explaining these differences but the specificities of 
the Spanish and Italian parties and party systems play also an important role, as I will argue 
below. 
 Table 6 offers us a final interesting result that helps to answer one specific question: Is 
salience stable in time and does it vary between arenas of competition? In the Hypothesis 1.4 
we considered the relevance of distinguishing between the two main arenas of competition, and 
it was argued that salience in electoral programmes should be more incremental while salience 
in parliamentary competition should be more discontinuous. The logic behind this hypothesis is 
related to the different goals and processes of electoral and parliamentary competition. While 
electoral programmes are consensual written documents, normally approved by party 
congresses, parliamentary interventions are less structured, party leaders have to position in 
different issues, where downplaying some of them may be impossible, and the speakers are 
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less constrained by their party.  Consequently, European salience in electoral programmes 
should be more incremental and continuous in time, with no great differences from one election 
to another8, while in the Parliamentary arena, European salience is more dependent on the 
context and on political strategies, being therefore much more discontinuous.  Table 6 provides 
with the coefficient of variation (CV) that allows comparing data with significantly different mean 
values.  The CV is simply the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean, that is, CV = δ/µ:  
  
[Table 6 around here] 
 
 As we can observe, the coefficient of variation is higher in parliamentary debates than in 
electoral programmes, supporting the idea that salience is more continuous in electoral 
competition than in parliamentary debates, where it is more context dependent and more 
subject to variation.  In the Italian case, we can observe a higher deviation than in the Spanish 
one, especially in parliamentary interventions.  These differences are also due, as I argued 
above, to the different institutional settings and the diverse political and economic context in 
both countries.  Not surprisingly, the higher CV is present in investiture debates closely followed 
by budget policy ones.  However, we can observe a higher difference in Italian electoral and 
parliamentary competition rather than in the Spanish one, showing a different party behaviour in 
the electoral and parliamentary arenas, as noticed by Bardi (2006), when he argued that, in fact, 
Italy has two clearly distinguishable party systems, the electoral and the parliamentary one9. 
 
When Europe suites my Interests: European Saliency and Parties  
The previous hypotheses dealt with three of the dimensions under analysis, countries, 
time, and policies.  However, the party level dimension is crucial for understanding how 
individual parties emphasise or not Europe in the electoral and parliamentary competition.  As I 
hypothesised, the saliency of Europe is related to the party’s position towards European 
integration, and hence, parties with a unitary and positive attitude towards integration should 
have a higher saliency. Equally, two main features can influence the individual parties’ the 
saliency of Europe, government/opposition status and majoritarian/non-majoritarian position. 
 One of the main assumptions of this paper is that the environment where parties act is 
also endogenous, not just external to the party.  Therefore, it is not coherent with this 
assumption to consider that the EU provides the same opportunities, incentives or constraints 
for all parties (and all countries) in the same way.  Parties, according to their ideology, their 
strategies and government position, may find different incentives in highlighting or not the 
European issue and policies. If we consider the Chapel Hill expert survey as an external 
measure of party positioning towards the EU, we can observe that Spanish parties have an 
overall positive position towards European integration, as the majoritarian PSOE and PP, and 
                                                 
8 Except in periods of party change, as we will see when dealing with single Spanish and Italian 
parties. 
9 Indeed, parties have their own parliamentary group even if they competed in elections under a 
coalition label. Furthermore, all the governments that followed a governmental crisis where 
supported by a different majority in the Parliament. 
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the ethnoregionalist of the PNV and CIU while just IU has a more neutral perception.  In the 
Italian case, Christian democrats (DC, PPI, CCD-CDU-UDC) and centre-left parties (DS and 
Democratici, then Margherita) have an undoubtedly pro-European position,  while centre-right 
parties have a more neutral stance (FI and AN) and the ethnoregionalist LN and the left party 
RC have a more negative position10.   
Regarding electoral programmes in Spain, the PNV is the party with a higher mean 
salience in the period under analysis with an important difference with the rest of parties.  The 
PNV highlights Europe as an important issue for its electoral appeal, party identity and strategy.  
In the case of the two majoritarian parties, the PP and the PSOE, they have quite similar 
salience in electoral competition, with minor differences in their scores in the total electoral 
programme and the selected policy domains.  As expected, IU has the lower European salience 
in electoral competition and, noteworthy, much lower in foreign policy.  The picture changes 
regarding parliamentary competition.  In this case, we can observe that the PNV has a very high 
salience in investiture debates, but with an equally high standard deviation.  Since 2000, the 
PNV strategically decided to focus their investiture debates, after the end of the party’s external 
support to the Aznar government, to the Basque problem, neglecting other issues, as the 
standard deviation shows.  Noteworthy, it is IU the second party with a higher European 
salience on these debates, followed by the PSOE and the PP.  Opposite of what it was 
hypothesised, Europe plays a more important role in these debates for the Spanish 
communists, because they contested the process of European integration and they had the 
incentive to make Europe another dimension of competition.  Finally, in budget parliamentary 
debates, the two majoritarian parties have the higher salience, which reflect their governmental 
status in different moments of the EMU process and hence, highlight the issue.  Other parties, 
such as the PNV and CIU have also a quite high mean salience while IU is the lowest one, even 
if with a higher standard deviation. 
[Table 7 and 8 around here] 
 
 In the Italian case, we can observe a different trend.  In electoral competition, we find 
that the Ulivo has the higher European salience in all domains except economic policy 
proposals, where RC’s mean salience is higher.  Some characteristics make Italy different from 
the Spanish case.  In first place, while in the two Spanish majoritarian parties their mean 
salience was quite close, in Italy we can observe a great difference between the two leading 
coalitions, Ulivo and CDL.  Except in foreign policy proposals, where both coalitions have a 
                                                 
10
 See the expert survey ‘Chapel Hill Party Dataset’ to map the position of parties in the pro-anti 
integration continuum and towards specific European policies. In this expert survey all Spanish 
parties rank over 6, that is, they have a favourable position on European integration (Psoe 6, 
69, Pp 6, 23, Ciu 6, 18, Pnv 6, 08) while IU (4, 38) is the only one with a more neutral position. 
In the Italian case DS 6, 46), Democratici (6, 45), UDC and Ccd-Cdu (6, 23) have a favourable 
position towards European integration. Forza Italian and National Alliance have a more neutral 
position (ranking 4,30 and 4,31 respectively) and, with a more critical position Rc, that somehow 
opposes to European integration and the Ln, that after their U-turn on European integration, are 
opposed to European integration ranking  2, 31.  
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similar salience (54, 67 and 53, 00 respectively), on the overall electoral programme and in 
economic and social proposals Europe is much more salient in the Ulivo coalition.  This can be 
due to the different parties that form each coalition.  In the case of the Ulivo, they had the 
incentive to emphasise Europe because the two leading parties (DS and Democratici-
Margherita) had a positive position towards Europe and they were in government when Italy 
successfully joined the Euro, claiming it as a great political achievement.  
On the other hand, the CDL coalition is formed by four main parties, each of them with a 
different European position.  While the CCD-UDC, following the Christian democratic tradition 
has a positive attitude towards the EU, FI and AN have a more neutral position and the LN 
since 1998 is clearly opposed to it.  Furthermore, once the Euro was adopted, they faced in 
government the negative consequences for Italian economy of the Euro and the loss of 
monetarian policies.  Thus, while in the Ulivo Europe is seen as a cohesive issue in an 
otherwise eclectic coalition, in the CDL Europe is much more controversial and consequently 
downplayed it.  Interestingly, the CDL had a higher mean salience than the different allied 
parties just in foreign policy proposals, while in the overall electoral programme and in economic 
policy is equal or lower than in the single member parties.   
Another difference between Italy and Spain is RC’s European salience, with a high 
European mean salience in the total electoral programme and, noteworthy, in economic policy 
proposals.  Contradicting our hypothesis, RC, with a negative European position, emphasised 
Europe because, strategically, they had the incentive to stress and politicise the issue as 
another dimension of contestation.  While in Spain IU prefers to highlight Europe in the 
parliamentary arena, RC does it in the electoral one but both parties are starting to perceive the 
EU, especially on the economic domain, as another dimension of competition, criticising it on 
very similar grounds, showing the importance of the Partisan model. Finally, in parliamentary 
competition, we can observe a different trend in Italy, compared with the electoral arena.  In 
Investiture Debates, the Ulivo stressed Europe to legitimise their incumbency and as an 
incentive for action, in the crucial period of the EMU implementation.  In second place, FI had 
also a quite high European salience followed by the DS and then the rest of parties.   Finally, in 
budget debates the two majoritarian coalitions had the higher mean salience, closely followed 
by the LN and then the rest of parties, including AN, DS and RC.  Noteworthy, the LN, even with 
a high mean, had also a very high standard deviation, which implies a very discontinuous trend 
in their European importance. 
A final point concerning individual parties has to be analysed.  The comparison between 
Italian and Spanish political parties offer us some interesting features as the higher importance 
of Europe when a party aims to make a mainstream evolution, such as AN and the PP, the 
importance of party stability (PSOE), intra-coalition consensus (Ulivo and CDL) and the 
importance of minoritarian and opposition status on certain policies.   
One of the shared features of Italian and Spanish individual party’s European salience 
is the increasing importance of Europe when a party evolved to more mainstream positions.  
Our analysis offered us two interesting cases: Alleanza Nazionale and Partido Popular.  AN 
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evolved from neo-fascists and anti-system positions of the former Movimento Sociale Italiano 
(MSI) to more mainstream and conservative positions that, after the breakdown of the First 
Republic, allowed them to overcome their marginalisation in the party system.  Lead by 
Gianfranco Fini, in 1995 AN sanctioned this mainstream evolution.  The analysis of salience 
shows an increasing European importance in the 1994 and 1996 electoral programmes, which 
can show how Europe was gaining importance to legitimise this mainstream turn.  In similar 
ways, Alianza Popular, formed by former Franco’s Minister Manuel Fraga, and second most 
voted Spanish party but very distant from the ruling PSOE, evolved to more European-like 
conservative positions under the rule of José María Aznar.  In 1989 they changed their name, to 
the current Partido Popular, and a more mainstream position, with less connotations of the old 
regime, that helped to find the support of the Spanish electorate in the 1996 election.  The 
analysis of salience, as in the AN’s case, showed the increasing European importance in the 
party’s electoral programme since 1989, after neglecting and criticising some European features 
of the Spanish negotiation lead by the PSOE.   
 A second interesting aspect is the importance of party stability and coalition cohesion.  
In the case of the Spanish Socialist Party, its lower historical European salience was in the 2000 
elections.  The VI Legislature (1996-2000) was very difficult for the party as they lost 
government after 14 years of incumbency, changed its historical leader, Felipe González, and 
the new leadership had problems to obtain the party’s and voters’ legitimacy.  Hence, the 
Secretary General Joaquín Almunia, elected after González’s resignation, decided to celebrate 
primaries to elect the PSOE’s candidate for the 2000 elections.  Unexpectedly, José Borrell 
defeated Almunia, opening a difficult period of bicephalous leadership.  After some corruptions 
scandals and observing the lack of support of the party leadership, Borrell resigned and 
Almunia competed in the elections where the PSOE obtained very poor results and the PP won 
an absolute majority of seats.  This difficult period for the PSOE highlighted the divisions within 
the party and, noteworthy, European salience was the lower of all the electoral programmes.  
Once the party gained stability after selecting Rodríguez Zapatero as their leader, European 
salience raised to its mean levels in the 2004 elections.  In periods of internal conflicts, other 
issues gain importance and the EU is left in stand-by. 
 The case of Italian coalitions shows the importance of internal cohesion an individual 
party positioning to understand the importance of Europe in their common political programmes.  
As the data has shown, the Ulivo-Unione coalition had more incentives to emphasise Europe in 
a very broad ideological coalition that includes among others different ideologies ranging from 
Christian democrats such as the UDEUR and some Margherita’s members, social democrats in 
the DS, communists (Partito dei Comunisti Italiani and RC in 2006), and new left parties such as 
the Greens (I Verdi).  However, the two most important parties in the coalition had a clear 
positive attitude towards the EU and, after their incumbency period where they lead the country 
to the Euro, Europe became a political asset.  On the other hand, the CDL coalition, even 
though somehow more cohesive in ideological terms, had a clear Eurosceptic party (the LN) 
and two more neutral ones (FI and AN).  Furthermore, while the centre-left coalition could use 
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Europe as an example of their political performance, the CDL in government since 2001, 
suffered some negative and unexpected consequences for Italian economy of the newly 
adopted common currency.  These diverse incentives and individual party’s position can explain 
the different the saliency of Europe in both coalitions and offer higher possibility for politization 
of Europe in Italy rather than in Spain, where the two majoritarian parties (and the 
ethnoregionalist) have almost the same favourable position.   
 A final point of the analysis of European salience is the growing importance of Europe in 
left parties, especially the communist IU and RC.  The data show an increasing politicization of 
Europe in these two parties, which oppose to the current process of integration in similar terms, 
showing their ideological opposition to different EU features and, notably, the Euro.  Therefore, 
while in Spain almost all parties have a positive attitude and, since the adoption of the Euro the 
issue has been de-emphasised, and in Italy the Ulivo has a more clear position and the CDL a 
controversial one, downplaying the issue, both communist parties lead the opposition towards 
the EU, with a more critical vision and a higher politization of the issue, making Europe another 
dimension of competition and exemplifying the idea of Europe as the politics of opposition 
Taggart and Szczerbiak 2003, Sitter 2002). 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 The empirical analysis has showed some interesting conclusions and the relevance of 
certain domestic, institutional and contextual factors for understanding the salience attributed to 
Europe on domestic political competition and the importance of distinguishing between 
countries, policies, arenas and a specific time period. The analysis has helped to prove and 
sometimes reject certain hypotheses and provides also with some hints of indirect impacts and 
usages of Europe on domestic political competition. Hence, why do parties enact, downplay or 
neglect the European issue?  
Parties and leaders may stress the EU and its policies for a variety of reasons. 
Incumbent parties and leaders switch on the European issue and its policies for legitimising 
their governmental programme and policy decisions or even for legitimising their own 
incumbency, as the Italian case and the successive governmental crisis has showed, 
demonstrating the importance of Bartolini’s Institutional model. Other parties, which have 
successfully adapted to the new European arena find the EU and some of its policies as a 
perfect complement for their ideology and political programme, as is the case in some 
ethnoregionalist parties (PNV, CIU and LN until 1998) where the EU helped to overcome some 
national constraints. Another interesting aspect is the role played by the EU for sanctioning a 
mainstream turn and a vote-maximising strategy in the party ideology as it was the case of the 
PP and AN or even for providing a common political ground on eclectic electoral coalitions, as in 
the Ulivo case, showing the role of the EU in cohesion-seeking strategies. 
 Parties and leaders switch off the issue by consciously neglecting it according to their 
interests. Opposition parties tend to place less emphasis on the effects, opportunities and 
constraints of European integration of domestic political action. While the government is part of 
the European consensus, participating on the European Council and negotiating European 
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policies, opposition parties have less information and access to these debates. Consequently, 
while governmental parties stress it, they downplay it focusing on other domestic issues, 
fostering the depolitization of the EU. However, with the current economic situation some 
opposition parties (or even governmental ones) can start to stress the policy limitations and 
domestic consequences of European policies. Another interesting explanation is related to 
parties and coalitions internal dissent. In the PSOE’s case, a period of party change implied that 
the European issue was less important and, according to salience theory, it was downplayed. In 
the CDL’s case, the parties that formed the coalition had different position and they switched off 
the issue, neglecting it in their electoral platforms. 
 An interesting aspect is why parties downplay and put the European issue on stand-by. 
The two majoritarian Spanish parties offer a good example. The European issue was very 
important during the EMU’s implementation process, in the mid 1990s. Then, when Spain 
successfully joined the Euro, the issue lost its relevance showing their consensus and an 
indirect side-effect, the EU’s depoliticization due to the policy collusion of the two majoritarian 
parties. This fact has different consequences. In first place, some parties found incentives to 
stress the issue and make it as another issue for political competition, as the case of IU, with a 
high saliency of Europe on budget debates and the Italian RC in electoral competition. In the 
current times of economic crisis and the evident policy limitations of the Euro for national 
governments and their policies to overcome the crisis, it will be interesting to observe if some 
parties start to politicise the issue again, in what terms and with what consequences. Another 
example is offered by Italy and its governmental instability. In those cases (14 governments in 
19 years) just the government stressed the issue, for legitimising their incumbency while 
opposition parties emphasised other issues, depoliticising de facto the European issue. 
 To sum up, there are a variety of reasons for which parties switch on, off or put in stand-
by the European issue and its policies. Contextual and institutional factors, party ideology, party 
position on integration, the arena of competition and the specific policy domain shows the 
multiples ways in which Europeanisation can have an effect on domestic political competition 
and its consequences. 
 The analysis of the salience of Europe in electoral and parliamentary competition in 
Italian and Spanish parties has provided with different empirical evidence of the importance of 
these factors for understanding when parties emphasise the European issue on domestic 
political competition and the possibility for politicization of the Europe at the domestic level. 
Furthermore, the analysis of Europeanisation can tell us different things about domestic political 
competition and, on the other hand, domestic political competition can tell us different things 
about European integration itself. The analysis of Europeanisation of domestic political 
competition and parties’ interiorisation of the EU and its policies seems necessary. The current 
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Table 6  
Coefficient of Variation in Italian and Spanish European Salience 
DOCUMENT/INTERVENTION ITALY SPAIN 
Total Electoral Programme 0, 47 0, 48 
Foreign Policy 0, 44 0, 53 
Economic Policy 0, 69 0, 52 
Social Policy 0, 44 0, 54 
Investiture Debates 1, 06 0, 78 
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